We demonstrate that an interregional policy scheme featuring trading of carbon dioxide emissions, redistributive resource transfers and global participation, a scheme which we call "Ideal Kyoto Protocol," yields an efficient equilibrium allocation for a global economy. An altruistic international agency -say, the Global Environment Facility -should operate the resource transfer mechanism. In addition, regional governments should be able to make independent policy commitments regarding how to control regional emissions of carbon dioxide in anticipation of the redistributive transfers. Our efficiency result suggests that the USA should be "bribed" to reverse its decision of not participating in the Kyoto Protocol.
We show that the equilibrium allocation for a global economy implied by an interregional policy scheme in which one region -the USA -does not participate is inefficient because resources are not transferred from or to the USA and the USA's government neglects the negative effects that its carbon dioxide emissions cause to the rest of the world. For a similar global economy, we also show that the equilibrium allocation implied by an interregional policy scheme which includes all regions in the globe -a scheme which we refer to as "Ideal Kyoto Protocol" -is Pareto efficient. The intuition for this important finding is simple and straightforward. The redistributive interregional transfer mechanism operated by an interregional agency -say, the GEF -makes every regional government realize that it is in its best interest to maximize global income. Every government knows, therefore, that its policy choice should internalize all externalities caused by its region's carbon dioxide emissions. This paper is closely related to a set of game-theoretic papers that use sequential games to study provision of public goods (see, e.g., Arce (2001) , Caplan et al. (2000) and Caplan and Silva (2002) ). None of these papers, however, combines emissions trading and transfers. To our knowledge the only other article that features such a combination is Chichilnisky, et al. (2000) . The authors demonstrate that equity and efficiency go hand in hand whenever carbon dioxide emissions are globally traded. In their framework, a market for emissions allocates resources efficiently if and only if international transfers are made in order to equalize social marginal utilities of consumption. They also show that this resource redistribution condition can be satisfied by an appropriate initial distribution of emission permits. Although our paper's message is fully consistent with theirs, our approach differs from theirs in two crucial ways in what respects the resource redistribution: (1) it is endogenous; and, more importantly, (2) it takes place after the regional governments choose their most desired emission quotas. It is the anticipation of the interregional resource transfers implemented by the GEF that makes the regional governments behave efficiently.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds the basic model. Section 3 characterizes a Pareto efficient allocation. Section 4 examines regional and interregional policy schemes. In subsection 4.1, we consider a policy setting in which regional governments, acting independently, simultaneously determine their environmental policy agendas. We characterize the equilibrium allocation of resources for the global economy in this arrangement and then demonstrate that it is inefficient. Next, we investigate two interregional policy regimes. Motivated by the USA's decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, in subsection 4.2 we consider a policy scheme in which all regions but one in the globe participate in it. The USA is excluded from both interregional emissions trading and transfer mechanisms, but it is able to announce -i.e., commit to -a regional policy scheme before the other regions make their own policy commitments under the Protocol. In the policy scheme of subsection 4.3, all regions participate in both mechanisms and make their policy commitments simultaneously. In both interregional policy settings, the GEF implements transfers after it observes the policy commitments of all regions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Basic Model
Imagine a global economy consisting of J politically autonomous regions and governments, indexed by j, j = 1,...,J. There are two globally traded consumption commodities, a commodity whose production generates emissions of carbon dioxide (e.g., an industrial good) and a commodity whose production is harmed by emissions of carbon dioxide (e.g., an agricultural good). Let j Y be region j's industrial product and E be the global quantity of carbon dioxide emitted in the atmosphere. We assume that
is, production of a unit of the industrial good leads to the emission of a unit of carbon dioxide.
The industrial sector in region j is competitive and consists of a large number of identical producers. Let j I be the (fixed) number of industrial producers in region j. Each industrial producer utilizes an input quantity 0 x j ≤ of the agricultural good to produce ( ) 
Region j is populated by j n immobile consumers. Consumers within each region are identical in that they possess identical preferences and incomes. Let one. This normalization will enable us to ignore the market clearing condition for the agricultural good, since it is automatically satisfied whenever the other conditions that characterize an equilibrium allocation are satisfied. The normalization also allows us to set p p Y ≡ .
Pareto Efficiency
Before we examine regional and interregional environmental policy making, it is useful to derive the set of Pareto efficiency conditions for our economy. A Pareto efficient allocation can be obtained as follows.
An interior solution satisfies:
Equations (1a) For future reference, it is worth noting that Pareto efficiency requires satisfaction of three important conditions. First, marginal agricultural products must be equalized across regions:
Second, marginal industrial products must also be equalized across regions:
Third, there must be interregional resource transfers. To see this, observe that we obtain the Pareto efficiency conditions (1a) -(1f) if and only if:
where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the resource feasibility constraint for the agricultural commodity and k λ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the utility constraint for region k.
Equations (2c) tell us how the agriculture commodity (our numeraire) should be allocated across regions.
One unit of the numeraire good transferred to region 1 from some region k, increases region 1's per capita utility by an amount 1 1 x n U , since the extra unit is shared by 1 n residents. Per capita utility in region k is decreased by
, since k λ is the shadow cost of the utility constraint and the unit shortfall is shared by k n residents. Hence, equations (2c) inform us that interregional transfers of the numeraire good are implemented up to the point where the marginal shadow transfer benefit (of each recipient region) equates the marginal shadow transfer cost (of each remitter region).
Regional and Interregional Policy Making
We start our analysis of regional and interregional policy making by considering a situation in which all regions independently decide how to control their emissions of carbon dioxide. We call this regime "Regional Environmental Policy Making." We later study two interregional policy schemes, denoted "Ideal
Kyoto Protocol" and "Kyoto Protocol without the USA." All regions in the globe participate in the "Ideal Kyoto Protocol." This is a scenario which apparently accords well with the Kyoto Protocol envisioned by its founders. All regions, except the USA, participate in the other interregional policy scheme, "Kyoto Protocol without the USA." This setting corresponds to a fairly optimistic view of the current situation, whereby all regions in the world, except the USA, will decide to participate. We do not consider other possible interregional policy schemes, characterized by fewer participating regions, because it does not seem likely that the Kyoto Protocol will survive if another country withdraws. 5 It is not unreasonable to
assume that yet another defection will trigger a chain of defections, which will eventually completely undermine the Protocol.
5 At this stage, the Kyoto Protocol can be implemented only if most of the 33 Annex I countries that remain decide to participate in it. A requirement for the Protocol to be enacted is that the set of participating countries contains countries that accounted for a share greater or equal to 55% of the total carbon dioxide emitted by the original 34 Annex I countries in 1990. The participation rates of the USA, Russia, Japan and Germany in the total emissions of Annex I countries in 1990 were 36.1%, 17.4%, 8.5% and 7.4%, respectively. If, in addition to the USA, Russia decides to withdraw, the Protocol will necessarily fail. If either Japan or Germany follows the USA's lead, the Protocol will not necessarily fail, but its chance of survival will be slim. Although defection of any other Annex I country will not be as harmful in a first instance, it is likely that it will eventually invite others to defect, undermining the Protocol's viability.
Regional Environmental Policy Making
Suppose that there is a separate market for emission permits within each region. This will facilitate comparison with the subsequent arrangements. The regional government in region j -henceforth called "regulator j" -sets a quota, j Q , of emission permits that can be sold. Regulator j endows each consumer in the region with j j j n Q q ≡ emission permits. Since consumption activities do not emit carbon dioxide, consumers are sellers in each regional market for emission permits. Every industrial producer in region j must purchase at a cost 0 c j ≥ an emission permit per unit of the industrial good he produces.
The representative consumer in region j sells j s emission permits, 
Assuming that the consumer finds it optimal to consume strictly positive amounts of both agriculture and industrial commodities, the solution to his problem satisfies (3a) and the following tangency condition:
Equation ( 
that is, the realized value of the regional marginal industrial product (left side) must be equal to the regional marginal input cost (right side). Let 
The agricultural sector in region j chooses { } j Y to maximize
taking p and E as given. The agricultural sector of each region maximizes profit if and only if
that is, the regional marginal agricultural product must be equal to the regional marginal input cost.
Equations (4b) enable us to implicitly define the input demand functions
. Then, the agricultural sectors' supply functions are
Given j r , the industrial sector in region j demands 
We now turn our attention to the problems facing regional regulators. First, we need to compute regional per capita incomes and then later derive the indirect utility functions of the regional representative individuals. Each regulator chooses a quota level of regional permits that maximizes the utility of his region's representative consumer.
Given equations (5b), we can write the total profits of the industrial and agricultural sectors in region j, as
respectively. Note that equations (5b) imply that
. Adding up the profits of both sectors, we have
This enables us to write regional per capita income as a function of p , j Q and Q as follows:
Regulator j chooses { } j Q to maximize
, as given. Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition for maximization of ( ) 
Equation (7b) clearly shows that each regulator seeks to maximize regional per capita income. From equation (6), we obtain:
Given equations (4a), (4b) and (5a), equation (7c) reduces to
Differentiating the first order condition (7d) with respect to j Q yields
The sign of the second order condition (7e) follows from strict concavity of j G and the fact that 0 c j Q < .
Hence, the per capita income function (6) is strictly concave and the first order condition (7d) is not only necessary but also sufficient for an interior maximum.
Assuming that equation (7d) holds for all j in the Nash equilibrium, we obtain:
Equations (8) inform us that each regulator finds it optimal to supply emission permits at the level in which the regional price of the permit equals the regional marginal damage caused by carbon dioxide emissions. Equations (8) 
. Given these definitions, we may write the market clearing condition for the industrial good as follows:
The price of the industrial good, p , is determined endogenously by equation (9).
In this setting, the equilibrium allocation for the global economy is given by conditions (3a), (3b), (4a), (4b), (5b), (8) and (9). Comparing these conditions with the Pareto efficiency conditions immediately reveals that regional policy making is inefficient. There are two sources of inefficiency: (1) the absence of interregional income transfers, since regional marginal shadow utilities of income are not necessarily equalized; and (2) the presence of interregional external effects associated with regional production of the industrial commodity, since every regulator neglects the negative effects that production of the industrial commodity in his region cause to every other region in the globe.
For future reference, let jD V denote region j's per capita utility level realized in the global equilibrium allocation described above.
Kyoto Protocol without the USA
Suppose that all regions in the globe, except for the USA, participate in an interregional policy schemedenoted "KP-USA" for notational simplicity -in which an interregional market for carbon dioxide emissions coexists with an interregional transfer mechanism. Motivated by current events, we postulate that the USA commits to an environmental policy before the KP-USA regions commit to their own environmental policies. In addition, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is only able to implement interregional transfers after it observes the policy choices of the KP-USA regions. The problem faced by the agricultural sector in each region of the globe, including the USA, is the same as in the regional policy making regime. Hence, equations (4b) are the profit maximization conditions for the regional agriculture sectors and the sectors' input demand and supply functions are respectively
The permit markets -in the USA and in the aggregate KP-USA region -clear if and only if
Given p , equation ( 
We are now ready to examine the three-stage policy game. Let us assume that the GEF's objective function is a weighted sum of regional per capita (indirect) The weights are exogenously given. We postulate that they are implied by the equilibrium of a political bargaining game, which takes place before the regions commit to participating in the KP-USA. We do not, however, attempt to formalize such a game here. This is an interesting avenue for future work.
Consider the third stage of the policy game. Given p , ( ) . Given these definitions, the GEF's problem can be alternatively expressed as the choice of { } J ,...,
. The first order conditions for maximization can be written as follows:
where 0 > ν is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint (12b). Equations (12a) tell us that the GEF redistributes income across the KP-USA regions in order to equate individuals' marginal utilities of income.
denote the KP-USA's aggregate income level. Close inspection of equations (12a) and (12b) reveals that we can define regional incomes as functions of the price of the industrial good and the KP-USA's aggregate income level,
Inserting these functions and Σ M into equation (12b), we obtain
Differentiating equation (12c) with respect to
where
The KP-USA's aggregate income level is given by the sum of initial endowments and profits over all KP-USA regions. Hence,
where one should remember that
In the second stage of the game, regulator k wishes to maximize 
Given equation (12d), we obtain the following result when we add up the J-1 equations (14a):
Equation (14b) is the equilibrium condition that determines the KP-USA's aggregate quota level.
It states that all regulators within the aggregate KP-USA region agree on a emission permit price equal to the sum of the marginal damages caused by carbon dioxide emissions to all KP-USA regions. As each regulator's maximization problem makes it clear, the transfers implemented by the GEF induce each regulator to choose a quota level which maximizes the KP-USA aggregate income level. Hence, each regulator has a strong incentive to internalize the externalities that production of the industrial good in his region causes to all other KP-USA regions.
Differentiating equation (15) with respect to 1 Q yields
Equation (16) demonstrates that an expansion in the USA's quota leads to a reduction in the KP-USA's aggregate quota.
In the first stage of the game, the regulator in the USA chooses nonnegative { } 
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition can be written as follows: 
. Then, the price of the industrial good is determined by:
The equilibrium allocation of resources for the global economy in this setting is characterized by equations (3b), (4b), (10a), (10b), (11a), (11b), (12a), (12b), (13), (14a), (14b), (17), (18) 
Combining equations (4b), (10a) and (18), we obtain
Now consider the Pareto efficiency conditions (1f) for j = 2,…,J. Equations (20a) differ from their
Pareto efficiency counterparts only in that they do not include the marginal damages caused to the USA. Equation (20b) differs from its Pareto efficiency counterpart in that it is perceived marginal damage does not correspond to the global marginal damage. It is also worth noting that the equilibrium conditions that tell us how interregional transfers are made do not correspond to their Pareto efficiency counterparts because the equilibrium conditions do not include transfers from or to the USA while Pareto efficiency requires interregional transfers be made across all regions in the globe.
For future reference, let 1 j V be region j's per capita utility level realized in the global equilibrium allocation described in this section.
Ideal Kyoto Protocol
Suppose now that all regions in the globe, including the USA, participate in the Kyoto Protocol (KP).
Regulators and the GEF play a two-stage game, whereby regulators commit to their environmental policies before the GEF implements interregional transfers. The equilibrium concept for the two-stage game is again subgame perfection. 
Inequality (28a) 
Now, notice that inequality (28b) implies that inequality (29a) as well as the set of J-1 inequalities (29b) can all be satisfied slack. Not only would the USA be better off by reversing its withdraw decision, but also every other region in the globe would benefit from conceding to terms -i.e., the bribe -that would persuade the USA to reverse its decision! Our global economy does not explicitly distinguish developed from developing regions. How does our analysis then capture the Kyoto Protocol's intention of transferring resources from developed to developing regions? Since the levels of per capita income are higher in developed regions than in developing regions, the marginal utilities of income are lower in developed regions. Given the exogenous weights assigned to regional welfare levels, the redistributive transfer mechanism operated by the GEF transfers resources from regions whose weighted marginal utilities of income are low to regions whose weighted marginal utilities of income are high. If, for example, the weights are equal across all regions, the transfer mechanism will necessarily transfer resources from developed to developing regions. Indeed, it can be shown that there is a large number of weight allocations that would imply resource transfers from developed to developing regions without violating the participation constrains (29a) and (29b).
It must also be stressed that our efficiency result depends crucially on the timing of the policy game played by regional regulators and the GEF. 6 It is, for example, straightforward to show that if the timing of the game were changed so that the GEF "moved" first and the regional regulators "moved" last, the implied subgame perfect equilibrium would not feature condition (26b) because the regulators would not attempt to maximize global income. Since they would essentially treat the GEF transfers as lump-sum transfers, their decisions would not depend on such transfers. Each regulator would choose a policy that maximizes regional income, neglecting therefore the negative externalities caused by regional emissions.
Fortunately, our assumption about the timing of the policy game appears to be consistent with reality. The GEF cannot possibly be a Stackelberg leader. Because it is incapable of punishing nations for not complying with environmental standards, it lacks political and economical powers to design and enforce interregional schemes to control emissions of carbon dioxide. Not surprisingly, design and enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol are responsibilities of the participating nations. As we mentioned in the introduction, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which represents the supreme body of the Convention, delegated authority to the GEF to operate the financial mechanism. Therefore, it appears quite reasonable to postulate that the GEF is a common Stackelberg follower in the policy game played with regional regulators.
Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate that there is a combination of emissions trading and transfer mechanisms that yields an efficient allocation of resources for a global economy. The transfer mechanism should be redistributive and operated after the regional governments make their policy commitments regarding how to control regional emissions of carbon dioxide. Furthermore, there should be global participation in both
mechanisms. An interregional scheme featuring global participation and the efficient mix of mechanisms and timing of operations described above is what an ideal Kyoto Protocol should look like.
